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The interaction of investment and financing decisions under moral hazard
Abstract:This paper examines how debt-induced risk shifting arising in the labor choice contributes to the interaction between investment and financing decisions. Due to equity's limited liability, increased use of debt leads to labor over-utilization compared with all-equity financing. In turn, increasing leverage to finance investment has no effect on the cost but, via labor, influences the expected benefit of marginal investment by affecting the size of shareholders' claim while reducing its likelihood. If the equity claim is reduced, investment and debt are inversely related; otherwise they could be positively related. The linkage between debt and investment exists because both are chosen anticipating the subsequent optimal labor choice, all three decisions are made before price uncertainty is resolved, and equity flotation costs exist.
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