| 上市公司激励约束机制最优边界研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 闫邹先,尚秋芬.上市公司激励约束机制最优边界研究[J].西安财经学院学报,2008,21(1):34-37. |
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| 作者姓名： | 闫邹先 尚秋芬 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 山东大学,经济学院,山东,济南,250100
2. 国家广电总局,培训中心,北京,100866 |
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| 摘 要： | 上市公司高管合谋是一个世界性的问题,本文通过对我国534家上市公司的实证分析,认为激励约束机制的失衡是造成我国上市公司合谋的重要原因。因此,必须加强上市公司的激励约束均衡机制建设,从理论上找到激励约束机制的最优边界。
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| 关 键 词： | 上市公司 高管合谋 激励约束机制 最优边界 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-2817(2008)01-0034-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年8月18日 |
Optimum Boundary Study on Incentive and Restriction Mechanism of Listed Company |
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| YAN Zou-xian,SHANG Qiu-fen.Optimum Boundary Study on Incentive and Restriction Mechanism of Listed Company[J].Journal of Xi‘an Institute of Finance & Economics,2008,21(1):34-37. |
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| Authors: | YAN Zou-xian SHANG Qiu-fen |
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| Abstract: | The listed companies collusion is a world problem.Through analysis of 78 listed companies that are punished by China Securities Regulatory Commission publicly,we think the unbalance of incentive and restriction mechanism is a very important reason to listed company's collusion.Therefore,we must reinforce the building of incentive and restriction mechanism.One of the innovations is that we found the optimum boundary of incentive and restriction mechanism theoretically. |
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| Keywords: | listed company collusion incentive and restriction mechanism optimum boundary |
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