地方官员变更对企业投资影响的空间范围——基于政企联盟重建的逻辑分析

文章运用政企联盟重建这一理论对政企双方行为进行分析,完整的解释了我国官员变更对企业投资影响所呈现出的区域、层级及所有制特征,利用2003-2012年沪深两市上市企业面板数据进行了实证研究。结果表明：（1）官员变更对企业投资的影响呈现区域性、层级性特征。省委书记变更省委书记变更不会对全省的企业投资产生显著影响,但导致省会城市的企业投资明显减少,对省会城市影响高于非省会城市影响;市委书记变更对市区企业投资影响显著高于对县区企业影响。（2）省委书记与国有企业建立的紧密联盟会突破本地性特征,延伸到外地,而省委书记与民营企业建立的默契联盟则具有明显的本地性。文章研究丰富了官员变更对企业投资影响的相关文献。

The spatial range of local government officials change to enterprise investment: A Study basing on government-enterprise alliance

Competition among local officials and the pursuit of economic performance have played a crucial role in economic growth of China,in order to obtain more resources, enterprises have the incentive to form alliances with officials. The Analysis of the government-enterprise alliance provides an important channel to understanding the corporate behavior,it will helps optimize government decisions.Previous studies have focused on the impact of changes in officialsat a certain administrative level,however,China is a decentralized governance mechanism country, this determines the spatial scope feature of official changes on corporate behavior,many research literatures analyzes this topic from the perspective of information economics,our research will test from a new angle of view.Basing on government-business alliance reconstruction theory,this paper explain the domain、hierarchy and ownership character of the effect of official change on investment, we test the viewpoint using panel data of list company on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange for the period 2003-2012. Our research shows that:(1) The effect of official change on enterprise investment shows domain and hierarchy characteristics. The change of the secretary of the provincial Party committee have no significant impact on all enterprise' investment, but the investment of enterprise in capital city significantly reduced;the investment of provincial capital city reduced more than other areas. The change of the secretary of the municipal party committee has more impact on urban enterprises than county enterprises. (2)The close alliance between the provincial Party Secretary and the state-owned enterprises will break through the local characteristics and extend to the other places, but the tacit alliance between the provincial Party Secretary and the private enterprises has obviously local characteristics.This study makes several contributions to the literature.First,this paper makes a whole comparison and analysis of local officials' effect on the investment behavior of enterprises at the provincial, municipal and county levels, we find that there is a clear spatial scope features for this effect in China, that is, the officials change has a more significant impact on the located enterprise. Second, We expand the theory of the influence of official changes on corporate behavior,in this study,we study the behavior of the government and enterprises at the same time. In order to achieve the economic goals, officials have the motive to promote the formation of political-enterprise alliances; enterprises are willing to cater to officials in order to obtain resources,then form close or loose alliances. Third, our study enrich the theory of the political-enterprise alliance, this paper analyzes the heterogeneity of investment behavior of two different types of government-enterprise alliance reconstruction. The study enriches the relevant literature on the influence of official change on enterprise investment.