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控股股东、自由现金流与过度投资
引用本文:姜乃平.控股股东、自由现金流与过度投资[J].广西财经学院学报,2012(1):86-91.
作者姓名:姜乃平
作者单位:安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥,230039
摘    要:以我国沪深A股上市公司2006—2008年数据为研究样本,从股权特征角度考察公司自由现金流过度投资行为,结果表明:(1)正自由现金流更易诱发过度投资行为;(2)大股东持股越高,现金流过度投资行为越严重;(3)股权制衡在一定程度上抑制过度投资;(4)第一大股东为国有股性质时,过度投资行为更严重。

关 键 词:控股股东  过度投资  自由现金流

Analysis on Controlling Shareholder,Free Cash Flow and Overinvestment
JIANG Nai-ping.Analysis on Controlling Shareholder,Free Cash Flow and Overinvestment[J].JOURNAL OF GUANGXI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS,2012(1):86-91.
Authors:JIANG Nai-ping
Institution:JIANG Nai-ping(School of Business,Anhui University,Hefei 230039,China)
Abstract:This paper studies free cash flow and overinvestment from the perspective of the ownership characteristics,using the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in China from 2006 to 2008.The results show:(1) It is more likely for the company with more positive free cash flow to have overinvestment behavior;(2) The higher equity the controlling shareholder occupies,the more serious the overinvestment behavior is;(3) Balanced ownership structure can restrain overinvestment;(4) The overinvestment behavior is more serious for the company with the largest shareholder being of state-owed property.
Keywords:controlling shareholder  overinvestment  free cash flow
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