国有上市公司控制权转让问题研究

国有上市公司的剩余索取权和剩余控制权是分离的,在监督机制弱化、内部人控制严重的公司治理缺陷下,作为国有股东的代理人有动机和条件通过转让控制权谋取私利,处于劣势地位的受让方必然“贿赂”出让方,以期以较低的价格获得控制权这种稀缺资源,结果导致国有资产流失。因此,有必要完善国有上市公司的监管机制和用人机制,在公开竞价下进行控制权转让,并且强化信息披露制度。

Research on Controlling Rights Transfer of State-Owned Public Companies

The residual claim and residual control of state-owned public companies is separate.When the corporate governance is defective with weak supervisory mechanism and serious insider control,state shareholders' agents have motivation and condition to transfer controlling rights for self-interest.On the other hand,the assignee must bribe assignor to acquire the rare resource—controlling rights at a lower price since they are at a disadvantage position.As a result,state assets would drain away.Therefore,we need to improve the supervisory and employment mechanism of listed state-owned company,to transfer the controlling rights in open bidding market,and to strengthen the information disclosure system.