Stochastic Cooperative Games: Superadditivity, Convexity, and Certainty Equivalents |
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Authors: | Jeroen Suijs Peter Borm |
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Affiliation: | Department of Econometrics and CentER, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | This paper extends the notions of superadditivity and convexity to stochastic cooperative games. It is shown that convex games are superadditive and have nonempty cores, and that these results also hold in the context of NTU games. Furthermore, a subclass of stochastic cooperative games to which one can associate a deterministic cooperative game is considered. It is shown that such a stochastic cooperative game satisfies properties like nonemptiness of the core, superadditivity, and convexity if and only if the corresponding deterministic game satisfies these properties.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C71. |
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Keywords: | cooperative games stochastic variables superadditivity convexity certainty equivalents |
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