公共渔场共同开发下的最优机制设计

本文考察了一种具有竞争性和非排他性的准公共物品开发中的过度开发问题,通过委托—代理模型说明在存在管制的情况下,能有效的遏制过度开发的问题,本文分析了在不同的剩余索取权分配情况下,参与人的最优努力水平和监管情况,结果表明剩余索取权的合理安排可以有效增加开发效率。

Best mechanism designed for exploitation of a kind of public goods together

The article reviews an excessive exploitation problem in a kind of＇quasi-public goods which is rival and non-exclusivity. Through a Trust-Agency model, it explains that if under supervisorship the excessive exploitation can be kept with limits. It analyses the participants＇ best efforts and authority at different assignment of authority, the result indicates the right arrange of authority can increase the exploitation efficiency effectively.