Inferring hawks and doves from voting records |
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| Institution: | 1. CentER and EBC, Tilburg University, CEPR, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, NL, The Netherlands;2. CentER and Netspar, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, NL, The Netherlands;3. CentER and EBC, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, NL, The Netherlands;1. Department of Economics, LMU Munich, Schackstraße 4, 80539 Munich, Germany;2. Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Poschingerstraße 5, 81679 Munich, Germany;3. CESifo, Germany;4. IZA, Germany;5. VATT Institute for Economic Research, Arkadiankatu 7, P.O. Box 1279, FI-00101, Helsinki, Finland;1. Bank of Italy, Directorate General for Economics, Statistics and Research, Structural Economic Analysis Directorate, Law and Economics Division, Via Nazionale 91, 00187, Rome, Italy;2. Bank of Italy, Directorate General for Economics, Statistics and Research, Florence Economic Research Unit, Via dell''Oriuolo 37/39, 50122, Firenze, Italy;3. CRELI (Catholic University Milan), Italy;1. Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Denmark;2. PeRCent, CESifo, CEPR, IZA;1. CERGE-EI, a joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Politickych veznu 7, 111 21 Prague, Czech Republic;2. IAE-CSIC and Barcelona GSE, Campus UAB, Bellaterra, Barcelona, 08193, Spain;1. EconomiX - CNRS, Université Paris Nanterre, 200 avenue de la république, 92001 Nanterre, France;2. LEM-CNRS, Université de Lille, Faculté des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, 59655 Villeneuve d''Ascq Cedex, France;3. CIRANO, Québec, Canada;4. Cracow University of Economics, Faculty of Economics and International Relations, ul. Rakowicka 27, 31-510 Krakow, Poland |
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| Abstract: | We analyze revealed policy preferences of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. From the voting records we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences, while more extreme policy preferences, both hawkish and dovish, are generally held by external members. An industry background is associated with more hawkish preferences. |
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| Keywords: | Voting records Central banking Committees Ideal points |
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