为什么公有企业控制权形成相反的激励

本文命题的提出,直接缘于张维迎与周其仁关于控制权回报的积极与消极之歧见。所给出的解释是,经理在相应控制企业中投入较多自有人力资本,就形成积极激励,反之则带来消极激励。这一假说的背景是公有企业控制权,它最初由强权安排,后来由交易界定。由交易界定的控制权安排,处于各有关当事人的博弈状态,其中存在着控制权的公共领域,能否控制企业取决于这个公共领域利用上的比较优势,占优者一般为企业自有资本的较大投入者,他因此获得的担保为他成功地实现公共领域的利用。所以,投入较多人力资本的企业经理获得企业控制权,并形成激励的自增强机制;反之,由政府投入而获任命或者较少投入人力资本于企业的经理,则把控制权当作谋取在职利益的手段。

Control Rights of Publicly Owned Enterprises:Why Induced Polar Incentive?

This topic is given to discuss the different opinions about the positive and negative repayment on control rights of publily owned enterprises between ZHANG Wei-ying and ZHOU Qi-ren. The article explains as follows: The positive incentive will be induced if a manager puts more self-owned human capital into relevant controlled enterprise, otherwise,the negative incentive will be done. This assumption is based on the control rights of publicly owned enterprises,arranged by power at frist and defined by transaction lately. There exists the public domain in the arrangment of control rights defined by transaction. Which are on the gamble situation of parties concerned. Whether enterprises are controlled or not depends on the advantages taken by them in the public domain. Who,having advantages,generally putting more into the self-owned capital of enterprise,may obtain guarantees and succeed in taking advantage of public domain. Therefore, the mangager who puts more human capital may obtain the control rights of enterprises and form self increasing system of incentive. Otherwise, the manager putting little human capital into enterprise or being assigned by government because of its human capital putting may regard the control rights as the method of seeking his post benefits.