Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments: Comment |
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Authors: | Bouwe R Dijkstra |
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Institution: | (1) School of Economics and GEP, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK |
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Abstract: | In this comment, I analyze Damania's political economy model (Environmental and Resource Economics 13: 415–433, 1999), correcting some flaws and clarifying some ambiguities. I arguethat the political parties are identical at the outset of the game. Onlyafter the parties have chosen the instrument (standards or taxation) and thestrictness of environmental policy do the environmentalists and thepolluting firms know which party to support in the election campaign. Inequilibrium, both parties choose the same platform, so that both have anequal probability of winning the election. |
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Keywords: | environmental policy political competition pollution taxes rent seeking |
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