Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods |
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| Authors: | George R Zodrow Peter Mieszkowski |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YW, UK;2. Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK;3. CAGE, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK;4. Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ, UK;5. Centre for Business Taxation, Oxford University, Park End Street, Oxford OX1 1HP, UK;6. SOSE — Soluzione per il Sistema Economico S.p.A, Via Mentore Maggini, 00143 Rome, Italy;1. University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences, ul. Dluga 44/50, 00–241 Warszawa, Poland;2. Warsaw School of Economics, Al. Niepodleglosci 162, 02–554 Warszawa, Poland;3. Narodowy Bank Polski, ul. Swietokrzyska 11/21, 00–919 Warszawa, Poland;1. Plymouth Business School, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth, PL4 8AA, United Kingdom;2. Department of Economics, University of Freiburg, Wilhelmstr. 1b, Freiburg i. Br. 79085, Germany;3. CESifo, Munich, Germany;1. University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Business School, United Kingdom and Rennes School of Business;2. SKEMA Business School-UCA, Paris, France;3. University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, United Kingdom |
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| Abstract: | Pigou's proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper. A simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services. The case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered. |
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