不同零售商在相同时期需求不同的经济批量博弈 |
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引用本文: | 杨瑞春,;陈占靖. 不同零售商在相同时期需求不同的经济批量博弈[J]. 适用技术市场, 2014, 0(9): 48-49 |
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作者姓名: | 杨瑞春, 陈占靖 |
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作者单位: | [1]河北北方学院理学院,河北张家口075000; [2]张家口技师学院,河北张家口075000 |
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基金项目: | 河北北方学院自然科学青年基金项目“库存博弈的费用优化分配”(项目编号:Q2013010) |
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摘 要: | 经济批量博弈是库存博弈的子问题,已经建立了经济批量的模型以及相关的基本理论知识,为研究经济批量模型所对应的博弈奠定了理论基础,对于合作博弈需要保证合作联盟的稳定性,因此需要研究经济批量博弈的凸性。利用合作博弈论的理论知识,线性函数的凹性,对推广的经济批量博弈证明了其凸性,进一步完善了经济批量博弈的数学理论。凸博弈保证合作联盟的稳定性,减少了商家的成本,增加了商家的利润。
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关 键 词: | 经济批量问题 经济批量博弈 凸性 |
At the Same Time,Different Retailers Has the the Different Demands for Economic Lot-sizing Game |
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Abstract: | The inventory games include economic lot-sizing game, at present, the related basic theory knowledge of the economic lot-sizing problem and the model had been established, as well as the foundation of the economic lot-sizing game, for the cooperative game we need to ensure the stability of the league, so we research the the convexity of an economic Lot-sizing Game. Using the knowledge of the cooperative game and the concavity of the linear function. Proving the the convexity of Economic Lot-sizing Game with back-logging. |
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Keywords: | economic lot-sizing problem economic lot-sizing cooperative convexity |
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