委托-代理、薪酬激励与商业银行治理

本文建立了一个银行薪酬激励约束的博弈模型，分析薪酬激励机制的决定和约束因素，并运用中国16家上市商业银行2001至2010年的面板数据对其进行了检验。结果发现中国上市银行高管薪酬激励与经营业绩因素之间基本正相关，与经营业绩稳定性因素没有相关性。其中，净资产收益率是影响高管薪酬的主要因素，而高管薪酬约束与经营风险因素之间没有确切的相关性。银行治理结构在银行经营业绩上有正向激励作用．在经营风险控制上并没有起到太大的作用。

Principal-Agent Relationship,Compensation Incentive and Commercial Bank Management

This paper establishes a principal-agent model to analyze the decision and constraints factors in commercial banks’ compensation incentive mechanism and tests the result with the panel data of China’s 16 commercial banks from 2001 to 2010.The empirical results support the hypothesis that the compensational incentive of top managers has a positive correlation with financial performance of China’s commercial banks but no correlation with the stability of the performance.The ROE is one of the main factors that impact the executive pay,but compensation of top managers and the operational risk is not relevant.Governance structure of banks has positive incentive effect on the operating performance of the bank,while it does not play a big role in controlling the business risk.