Mechanisms for dividing labor and sharing revenue in joint ventures

Organizing the productive efforts of firms participating in a joint venture involves assigning firms to tasks according to abilities. A multidimensional incentive problem arises when abilities are private information. In any equilibrium, it is better to be a firm who is a specialist rather than a generalist. However, generalists can expect to receive a larger allocation of revenue. If at least one firm is decisive to the profitability of the joint venture (i.e., if it can make a credible cost announcement that implies the joint venture earns zero profit), then the joint venture will not be able to implement a profit maximizing or cost minimizing production plan.Received: 21 March 2002, Accepted: 26 February 2004, JEL Classification: D82, C78, L23Any views expressed in this paper are not purported to reflect those of the United States Department of Justice. This paper benefited from the helpful comments of a referee and an associated editor.