Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences |
| |
Authors: | Dominique Lepelley |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) C.R.E.M.E., U.R.A. C.N.R.S. D 1273, Université de Caen, Caen, France;(2) Faculté de Sciences Economique, Université de Caen, 14032 Caen Cédex, France |
| |
Abstract: | Consider a three-alternative election with n voters and assume that preferences are single-peaked. LetC(λ,n) be the Condorcet efficiency of the rule that assigns 1,λ and 0 points (respectively) to each first, second and third place vote. An exact representation is obtained forC(λ,∞). This relation shows that Borda rule (λ=1/2) is not the most efficient rule. In addition to this result, exact closed form relations are provided forC(0,n),C(1/2,n) andC(1,n). All these relations are obtained by assuming that every admissible configuration of preferences is equally likely to occur. This research was supported in part by the Swedish Insitute |
| |
Keywords: | D71 |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|