On the collusive nature of managerial contracts based on comparative performance |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy;2. Piazza Scaravilli 2, Bologna 40126, Italy;3. Strada Maggiore 45, Bologna 40125, Italy;1. Graduate School of Economics, Momoyama Gakuin University, 1-1, Manabino, Izumi, Osaka 594–1198, Japan;2. Research Institute for Socionetwork Strategies, Kansai University, 3-3-35, Yamate, Suita, Osaka 564–8680, Japan;1. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Udine, Via Tomadini 30, Udine 33100, Italy;2. Economix, UPL, Univ Paris Nanterre, CNRS, Nanterre F92000, France;3. Durham University Business School, Durham University, Durham DH1 3LB, United Kingdom;1. Research School of Economics, College of Business and Economics, Australian National University, HW Arndt Building 25A, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia;2. Visitor, Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, 9242 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095;3. School of Economics, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China |
| |
| Abstract: | We show that managerial delegation based upon comparative performance may generate collusive outcomes observationally equivalent to those typically associated with repeated games or cross ownership. This happens when rivals’ profits are positively weighted in the managerial incentive scheme. We also identify the level of time discounting at which a repeated game based upon Nash reversion would achieve the same degree of collusion. Accordingly, such managerial contracts should attract the attention of antitrust authorities. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
