Takeover bids and the relative prices of shares that differ in their voting rights |
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| Institution: | 1. Center on Aging Psychology, Key Laboratory of Mental Health, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China;2. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China;3. Magnetic Resonance Imaging Research Center, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China;4. Institute of Developmental Psychology, School of Psychology, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China;5. Department of Behavioral Science, University of Kentucky College of Medicine, Lexington, KY, USA;6. Xingtai University, Xingtai, HeBei 054000, China;1. Université Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, LJK, UMR 5224, 700 av. centrale, IMAG/CS-40700, Grenoble 38058 CEDEX 9, France;2. Université Clermont Auvergne, LIMOS, UMR 6158, Campus Universitaire des Cézeaux, BP 86, Aubière 63172 CEDEX, France;3. Université Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Verimag, UMR 5104, 700 av. Centrale, IMAG/CS-40700, Grenoble 38058CEDEX 9, France |
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| Abstract: | The relative prices of shares that differ only in their voting rights are modelled. In our model, voting rights become valuable when a control contest is decided through takeover bids for outside votes. The study shows how the value of the voting right depends on the initial ownership distribution, the share structure, and the ability of the incumbent manager versus a rival for control. Empirical support for the model is provided using Swedish stock market data. |
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