| Abstract: | This model examines the case of managers whose signals, when informative, are perfectly correlated as in the Scharfstein and Stein model 1990. The American Economic Review 80(3): 465–479]. This has a herd increasing impact as it introduces a positive reputation externality. On the other hand, it is also assumed that managers have perfect knowledge of their own ability, an assumption with herd reducing implications. Combining these two offsetting, in terms of herding, assumptions, it is found that a smart manager who plays first will sometimes, but not always, truthfully announce his/her private information. On the other hand, a smart manager who plays second will always report his/her true signal, while a dumb manager who plays second may herd, either on the first manager's action and/or on the prior. It is also found that the more likely a dumb manager who plays second is to herd on the first manager's action, the less likely is a smart manager who plays first to herd on the prior. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
