A comparative study of bureaucratic corruption in Latin America and the U.S.A.

The starting point of this paper is a conceptual model of bureaucratic corruption, based on the assumption that bureaucrats (a) maximize personal utilities, and (b) control a monopoly in the production of certain goods and services. This conceptual model leads to a system of three equations representing demand, supply and market clearance of the goods and services supplied by the bureaucracy. Using the market clearance equation, an equation for the level of corruption in a bureaucracy is obtained. The conceptual model helps to specify the signs of the partial derivatives of the level of corruption with respect to the explanatory variables. Two sets of data are used to test the model. The first refers to levels of corruption in the bureaucracies of 17 Latin American countries, while the second deals with levels of corruption of Federal officials working in individual states in the U.S.A., state officials, and local officials. The conclusions obtained thus far using the statistical analysis confirm the expectations derived with the conceptual model.