On the Least Core and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set |
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| Authors: | Ezra Einy Ron Holzman Dov Monderer |
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| Affiliation: | a Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University, Beer Sheva, 84105, Israel;b Department of Mathematics, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, 32000, Israel;c Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, 32000, Israel |
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| Abstract: | We show that the least core of a TU coalitional game with a finite set of players is contained in the Mas-Colell bargaining set. This result is extended to games with a measurable space of players in which the worth of the grand coalition is at least that of any other coalition in the game. As a consequence, we obtain an existence theorem for the Mas-Colell bargaining set in TU games with a measurable space of players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71. |
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