Returns to networking in academia |
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Authors: | João Ricardo Faria Rajeev K Goel |
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Institution: | 1.University College,University of Texas at El Paso,El Paso,USA;2.Department of Economics,Illinois State University,Normal,USA |
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Abstract: | This paper examines effects of academic networks in a Stackelberg differential game between journal editors and authors. Authors
choose research papers to maximize satisfaction, while editors determine research quality to maximize journal reputation.
Verifying the system for stability, results show that academic networks neither affect the number of publications nor the
quality of an author’s papers. Networks only affect the number of an author’s citations. Editors’ preferences for publishing
an author because of her network membership seem irrelevant. This happens because editors compete to increase their journal’s
reputation by publishing high quality papers. Consequently, there is little room for editorial bias. Further, increased journal
competition has the potential to erode the citation gains. The equilibrium research quality is below the maximum possible
quality. Increases in publication benefits are shown to leave citations unaffected, increase the number of publications, and
decrease research quality. The results generally carry through when publishing markets tend to a monopoly. |
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Keywords: | |
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