Adoption externalities as public goods |
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Authors: | Philip H Dybvig Chester S Spatt |
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Institution: | School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520, USA;Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA |
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Abstract: | A public good problem arises naturally in situations characterized by positive externalities or negative externalities. For positive externalities, agents furnish a public good by taking an action. Similarly, for negative externalities, agents furnish a public good by not taking an action. We examine these externalities in a binary choice problem, i.e. adoption externalities. In each case, there is a potential role for government intervention, even when equilibrium transfers are not allowed, since one equilibrium Pareto dominates all others. We analyze the positive and normative features of equilibria in these models, and we explore the possibility of useful government intervention. |
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