Tournaments, minimum wage, and money non-neutrality |
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Authors: | Chung-Cheng Lin C C Yang |
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Institution: | a Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Nankang, Taipei 115, Taiwan;b Department of Public Finance, National Cheng-Chi University, Wenshan, Taipei 116, Taiwan |
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Abstract: | To reconstruct the micro-foundation of Keynesian macro-economics, the efficiency wage theory has generally been considered a success in providing a plausible explanation for the existence of involuntary unemployment. However, little has been said about how monetary policy causes fluctuations in aggregate employment and output in the efficiency wage theory. This paper extends Lin and Yang’s Econ. Inq. 39 (2001) 644] shirking-type efficiency wage model with tournaments to account for money non-neutrality. A distinct feature of our model is that, due to the adoption of tournaments, there will be a hierarchical wage structure rather than a flat wage in the economy. As will be argued, the labor market characterized in this paper is in a sense a reversion to Keynes’ General Theory, but also an improvement upon it. |
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Keywords: | Tournament Shirking Minimum wage Money non-neutrality |
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