Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Empirical Evidence from the Soccer Pitch |
| |
Authors: | Christian Deutscher Bernd Frick Oliver Gürtler Joachim Prinz |
| |
Affiliation: | 1. University of Bielefeld, DE‐33615 Bielefeld, , Germany;2. University of Paderborn, DE‐33098 Paderborn, , Germany;3. University of Cologne, DE‐50823 Cologne, , Germany;4. University of Duisburg‐Essen, DE‐47057 Duisburg, , Germany |
| |
Abstract: | In this paper, we address the problem of sabotage in tournaments with heterogeneous contestants. In a first step, we develop a formal model, which yields the prediction that favorites exert higher productive effort, while underdogs are more tempted to engage in destructive actions (sabotage). This is because favorites have a higher return on productive effort and both types of effort are substitutes. In a second step, we use data from German professional soccer to test this prediction. In line with the model, we find that favorite teams win more tackles in a fair way, while underdog teams commit more fouls. |
| |
Keywords: | Heterogeneity sabotage soccer tournament D74 J33 M52 |
|
|