Externalities, monopoly and the objective function of the firm |
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Authors: | David Kelsey Frank Milne |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Exeter, Exeter, EX4 4PU, England;(2) Department of Economics, Queens University, Kingston, Ontario, 7L 3N6, Canada |
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Abstract: | This paper provides a theory of general equilibrium with externalities and/or monopoly. We assume that the firm’s decisions are based on the preferences of shareholders and/or other stakeholders. Under these assumptions a firm will produce fewer negative externalities than the comparable profit maximising firm. In the absence of externalities, equilibrium with a monopoly will be Pareto efficient if the firm can price discriminate. The equilibrium can be implemented by a two-part tariffWe would like to thank John Fender, Herakles Polemarchakis, Les Reinhorn, John Roberts, John Roemer, Colin Rowat, Erkan Yalcin two anonymous referees and participants in seminars at the Universities of Birmingham, Durham, Heidelberg, Mannheim and Queens, the Public Economic Theory conference at the University of Warwick, July 2000, and the EEA congress, Lausanne 2001 for comments and suggestions |
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Keywords: | Externality General equilibrium Two-part tariff Objective function of the firm |
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