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More on phantom bidding |
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| Authors: | Parimal Kanti Bag Emin Murat Dinlersoz Ruqu Wang |
| Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Birkbeck College, University of London, 7-15 Gresse St., London W1P 2LL, UK (e-mail: pbag@econ.bbk.ac.uk), GB;(2) Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627-0156, USA (e-mail: enmd@troi.cc.rochester.edu), US;(3) Department of Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6, CANADA (e-mail: wangr@qed.econ.queensu.ca), CA |
| Abstract: | Summary. A phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following issues are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to phantom bidding. The buyers' profits will increase whenever social welfare increases. Received: November 4, 1998; revised version: February 8, 1999 |
| Keywords: | and Phrases: English auction Phantom bidding Fixed/flexible reserve price |
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