Hard evidence and mechanism design |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199, USA;2. Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508, USA;1. TSE (GREMAQ, Université Toulouse 1), 21 allée de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France;2. School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997800, Israel;3. Department Economics and Decision Sciences, HEC Paris, 1, rue de la Libération, 78 351 Jouy-en-Josas, France;1. Princeton, United States;2. NES, United States;3. UCL, United Kingdom;4. Yale, United States;5. NYU, United States;1. Department of Economics, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA;2. Department of Economics, Korea University, Seoul 136-701, Republic of Korea;1. School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University, Israel;2. David Eccles School of Business, The University of Utah, United States of America;3. Economics Dept., University College London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;4. CFM, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;5. London School of Economics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland |
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| Abstract: | This paper addresses how hard evidence can be incorporated into mechanism-design analysis. Two classes of models are compared: (a) ones in which evidentiary decisions are accounted for explicitly, and (b) ones in which the players make abstract declarations of their types. Conditions are provided under which versions of these models are equivalent. The paper also addresses whether dynamic mechanisms are required for Nash implementation in settings with hard evidence. The paper shows that static mechanisms suffice in the setting of “evidentiary normality” and that, in a more general environment, one can restrict attention to a class of three-stage dynamic mechanisms. |
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