A Further Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-tournament R&;D Duopoly |
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| Authors: | Antonio Tesoriere |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Dipartimento di Scienze Economico Aziendali e Finanziarie, Facoltà di Economia, Università degli Studi di Palermo, Vpiano, Edificio 13, Viale delle Scienze, 90128 Palermo, Italy |
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| Abstract: | This note considers the paper of Poyago-Theotoky (1999) on strategic R&D with endogenous spillovers. It proves through an example that, under R&D collusion, optimality sometimes requires either minimal or asymmetric spillovers. It also provides a simple sufficient condition for optimal spillovers between colluding firms to involve maximal spillovers (i.e., complete sharing of information). |
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| Keywords: | Endogenous asymmetry Endogenous spillovers R& D collusion |
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