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对中小企业技术创新项目风险投资的博弈分析
引用本文:穆艳华. 对中小企业技术创新项目风险投资的博弈分析[J]. 商业研究, 2005, 0(20): 68-70
作者姓名:穆艳华
作者单位:暨南大学,管理学院,广东,广州,510632
摘    要:在中小企业对技术创新项目进行融资的过程中,风险投资是其融资的一个重要途径,而风险投资人与风险企业之间会因利益的分配展开博弈。通过建立风险投资人与风险企业之间的博弈模型,可以看出风险企业对利润率高的技术创新项目进行风险融资的可行性并不高,所以风险投资人应谨慎选择风险企业进行投资,以降低资金风险。

关 键 词:技术创新  风险投资  混同均衡
文章编号:1001-148X(2005)20-0068-02
收稿时间:2004-07-06
修稿时间:2004-07-06

The Game Analysis on Venture Investment in SMEs'''' Technological Innovation Project
MU Yan-hua. The Game Analysis on Venture Investment in SMEs'''' Technological Innovation Project[J]. Commercial Research, 2005, 0(20): 68-70
Authors:MU Yan-hua
Affiliation:School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou, Guangdong 510632, China
Abstract:As small and medium- sized enterprises finance for their innovative technology projects, venture capital is always an important resource. Venture capital investors and venture enterprises often initiate their games because of benefit division. Through setting up and analyzing the game modal between venture capital investors and venture enterprises, this paper concludes that the feasibility of obtaining venture capital for high profit margin is not high. It suggests that venture capital investor should be cautious in selecting venture enterprises to lower the risks of capital.
Keywords:technological innovation   venture investment    pooling equilibrium
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