Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game |
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Authors: | Joëlle Noailly Cees A Withagen Jeroen C J M van den Bergh |
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Institution: | (1) CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, The Netherlands;(2) Department of Spatial Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Free University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;(3) Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands;(4) Institute for Environmental Studies, Free University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game. We consider three types
of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource.
Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined
by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the
highest average payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be
the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies
coexist. We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system
favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria.
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Keywords: | common property cooperation evolutionary game theory local and global interaction game self-organization |
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