Pirates and traders: Some economics of pirate-infested seas |
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Authors: | Brishti Guha Ashok S. Guha |
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Affiliation: | a Department of Economics, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, 178903, Singaporeb School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India |
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Abstract: | Even where all agents are risk-neutral, merchants can insure themselves against piracy. Such self-insurance is surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard. Further, there exist a patrolling intensity and/or penalties for captured pirates which, along with mercantile self-insurance, could eliminate piracy. |
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Keywords: | K4 D8 F1 |
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