我国地方政府竞争行为的制度分析

地方政府是我国社会经济运行中特殊的利益主体。这些利益主体会通过制度创新来获取自身利益曩大化，在此过程中会产生利益冲突和利益竞争。同时，中央对地方政府的“创新扩张”回应的迟滞又使得原本等级森严的行政协调系统在新规则的冲击下出现了制度罅隙，以设置本地市场的进入壁垒为特征的地方保护便得以滋长，从而导致竞争行为的异化。因此，必须通过分化政府职能、调整权力结构、健全决策过程以及重构绩效评估机制来实现中央与地方的制度整合。

A Study on the System in the Competition among Local Governments

With the economy transition and the marketization in our country, local governments are becoming special interests subjects in the social economic operation of our country gradually. These interests subjects will make their own interests maximize through institution innovation,which will produce interests conflicts and interests competitions. Meanwhile, the Central Government logy response to the innovation makes the lacuna in the administrative coordination which is regular originally, local protection rises in the lacuna whose characteristics is setting the barrier to prevent from entering the local market, that is, the dissimilation of competitive behavior. It is necessary to predigest govermment function, adjust power structure, perfect the decision making process and reform the system of performance evaluation.