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高新技术企业控制权分配:基于合作博弈解释
引用本文:邢斐. 高新技术企业控制权分配:基于合作博弈解释[J]. 云南财贸学院学报, 2005, 21(5): 15-19
作者姓名:邢斐
作者单位:中南财经政法大学劳动经济研究所,湖北武汉430060
摘    要:高新技术企业进入快速成长期,在有风险融资的情况下,创业者面临着控制权与所有权的失控。从控制权具有激励约束功能的角度出发,构造了一个控制权分配的合作博弈模型,通过比较静态分析,讨论了高新技术企业控制权分配的影响因素,并就相关理论问题作了进一步回答。

关 键 词:控制权分配 高新技术企业 激励约束功能 合作博弈
文章编号:1007-5585(2005)05-0015-05
收稿时间:2005-06-06
修稿时间:2005-06-06

An Analysis of the Allocation of Control Rights in High -tech Enterprise:A cooperative Game Approach
XING Fei. An Analysis of the Allocation of Control Rights in High -tech Enterprise:A cooperative Game Approach[J]. Journal of Yunnan Finance and Trade Institute, 2005, 21(5): 15-19
Authors:XING Fei
Abstract:With the rapid development of high-tech enterprise, venture entrepreneurs are under the pressure to deal with the out-of-control in control fights and ownership. From the perspective of incentive- restriction function, the paper developed a cooperative game model of the allocation of control rights, and analyzed the reasons influencing the allocation of control rights under comparative static analysis. Furthermore, the paper answered some theoretical issues.
Keywords:Allocation of Control Rights    High-tech Enterprise    Incentive - restrictionFunction    Cooperative Game
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