碳排放配额政策的环境效应和贸易效应研究

基于不完全市场竞争理论，构建了两个对称国家碳排放配额政策选择与企业碳减排选择的两阶段博弈模型，运用逆向求解法求得了均衡解，并通过进一步分析碳排放许可证政策、碳排放配额许可交易政策和许可交易碳排放权合作政策的福利效应，得出了两国政府碳排放配额政策选择的激励相容条件和参与约束条件，确定了全局稳定均衡最优解及其条件；此外，还分析了两国政府碳排放许可证政策、碳排放配额许可交易政策和许可交易碳排放权合作政策的环境效应和贸易效应。结果表明：从福利效应来看，许可交易碳排放权合作政策是全局稳定最优解，可以资源的有效配置，实现Pareto改进；从环境效应来看，许可交易碳排放权合作政策也是严格占优的，有助于减少各国和全球净污染排放量；从贸易效应来看，碳排放配额许可交易政策好于许可交易碳排放权合作政策。因此，北-北型对称国家会优先选择许可交易碳排放权合作政策，南一南型对称国家在一定时期内仍然会优先选择碳排放配额许可交易政策，南-南或北-北型对称国家之间容易实现碳排放政策合作，实现全球环境合作还有待时日。

Research on the Environment and Trade Effects of Carbon Emission Quota Policies

Based on the theory of imperfect competition, a two - stage game model between two symmet- ric governments＇ policies on carbon emission quota and firms＇ decisions on abatement is constructed, and the e- quilibrium solution of this game model is obtained by using the backward induction. Furthermore, conditions of individual rationality constraint and incentive compatibihty constraint are presented by analysis of the welfare effects of non- tradable permits policy, tradable quota policy and cooperative tradable quota policy, the opti- mal general steady equilibrium solution is also confirmed. Besides, environment effects and trade effects of these policies are studied. It＇s shown that in terms of welfare effects, cooperative tradable quota policy, which can lead to effective allocation of resource and Pareto improvement, is the equilibrium solution of this game. From the view of environmental effects, cooperative tradable quota policy, which can lead to less net carbon e- mission, is also strictly dominant. However, considering trade effects, tradable quota policy is better to coop- erative tradable quota policy. In a word, North - North countries would prefer cooperative tradable quota poli- cy, but South -South countries would give priority to tradable quota policy, cooperation among North -North countries or South - South countries is more realistic when faced by environment issues, and it needs time to a- chieve global environmental cooperation.