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A NOTE ON ENDOGENOUS TIMING WITH STRATEGIC DELEGATION: UNILATERAL EXTERNALITY CASE
Authors:Kangsik Choi  Yuanzhu Lu
Institution:1. Graduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, Republic of Korea;2. China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China
Abstract:We investigate the endogenous choice of roles by managerial firms in the presence of unilateral externality. The choice over timing can be taken either by managers or by owners. It is shown that: (i) the choice of the timing by managers entails the same profit that owners would have achieved by specifying the timing in the delegation contract; and (ii) firms move simultaneously if the degree of unilateral externality is small, while sequentially if the degree of unilateral externality is large, with the firm generating unilateral externality as a follower; the owner of the follower firm delegates to restrict output, while his/her counterpart does not delegate it.
Keywords:endogenous timing  externality  managerial delegation  Stackelberg  D43  L13  M21
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