Incentives and Performance in Real Estate Brokerage |
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| Authors: | Munneke Henry J Yavas Abdullah |
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| Institution: | (1) Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, 30602-6255;(2) Pennsylvania State University, 409 Business Administration Building, University Park, PA, 16802 |
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| Abstract: | This article has two objectives. One is to offer a theoretical model to study how the difference in commission structures affects the performance of agents at full-commission firms (e.g., RE/MAX agents) relative to other agents. The other is to provide an empirical test of the relative performance of full-commission agents. We predict that in equilibrium the selling price and the expected time it takes to sell a listing through a full-commission agent are the same as they are with a traditional agent. Our theoretical predictions are supported by our empirical results. |
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| Keywords: | brokerage commission structures house prices time on the market |
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