零售商的风险规避特性和公平偏好对绿色供应链运作的影响

针对市场需求的不确定性，本文通过建立风险规避型零售商与风险中性供应商的Stackelberg博弈模型，供应商为主导者，综合考虑零售商风险规避特性和公平偏好心理对该供应链运作产生的影响。研究发现，当风险规避型零售商不具有公平意识时，零售商的风险规避程度与供应商的批发价、绿色创新投入水平以及供应商和供应链整体的效用正相关；供应商的绿色成本系数的大小可影响风险规避程度对产品售价以及零售商效用的影响。当风险规避型零售商具有公平偏好时，零售商的公平偏好负向影响产品售价、批发价以及供应商绿色投入水平和供应商效用；零售商公平偏好对零售商以及供应链效用产生的影响受到零售商风险规避程度的影响。

The Impact of Retailer's Risk Aversion and Fairness Preference on Green Supply Chain Operation

The paper establishes the Stackelberg game model of supplier and risk aversion retailer taking the uncertainty of market demand into consideration. The supplier is the leader. The paper studys the integratedeffect of retailer’s risk aversion and fair preference psychology on the operation of the supply chain. We find that when the risk aversion retailer does not have a sense of fairness，the degree of risk aversion of the retailer is positively related to the supplier’s whole sale price，the level of green innovation input，and the effectiveness of the supplier and the whole supply chain. And the impact of risk aversion on product prices and retailer utility is affected by the size of the supplier’s green cost factor.When the risk aversion retailer has a fair preference，the retailer’s fair preference negative affects the product price，the wholesale price，and the supplier’s greeninput level and supplier utility.Meanwhile，the impact of retailers’，fair preferences on retailers and supply chaineffectiveness is affected by the risk of retailers’ risk aversion.