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奖惩机制下回收投资成本分担对闭环供应链决策的影响研究
引用本文:王文宾,范玲玲,周维明.奖惩机制下回收投资成本分担对闭环供应链决策的影响研究[J].工业技术经济,2017,36(6):146-154.
作者姓名:王文宾  范玲玲  周维明
作者单位:中国矿业大学,徐州 221116
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目
摘    要:为了探讨奖惩机制下制造商与回收商分担固定回收投资成本对闭环供应链决策的影响,利用博弈论建立了由制造商、回收商和消费者构成的闭环供应链模型。通过对比分析及仿真得出各决策变量基于制造商分担比例及奖惩力度的变化。研究表明:仅考虑制造商分担回收投资成本、奖惩机制下制造商分担回收投资成本均能有效提高回收率,降低零售价,提高产品需求量,且第二种机制作用效果更佳。适当的分担比例和奖惩力度可以提高制造商和零售商的利润。因此,在合理的奖惩力度下制造商分担一定的回收投资成本时,闭环供应链各成员能实现互利共赢。

关 键 词:闭环供应链  分担  回收投资成本  奖惩机制  再制造  决策  

Impact of Sharing Recycling Investment on Closed-loop Supply Chain Decisions under RPM
Wang Wenbin,Fan Lingling,Zhou Weiming.Impact of Sharing Recycling Investment on Closed-loop Supply Chain Decisions under RPM[J].Industrial Technology & Economy,2017,36(6):146-154.
Authors:Wang Wenbin  Fan Lingling  Zhou Weiming
Institution:China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221116,China
Abstract:Thispaper establishes a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer,a collector and consumers.Under the guidance of extended producer responsibility,we study that manufacturer and collector share fixed investment costs in collecting waste electronic and electrical equipment under reward-penalty mechanism.We discuss the change of price,collection rate and the profit by comparison.The resultsshow:reward-penalty mechanism and manufacturer sharing fixed investment under reward-penalty mechanism can improve the collection rate,decrease retail price.And the second mechanism is better.In addition,profits of manufacturer and retailer all increase when the reward-penalty strength and sharing proportion meet certain conditions.The members of closed-loop supply chain can achieve a win-win situation.
Keywords:closed-loop supply chain  sharing  fixed investment  reward-penalty mechanism  remanufacturing  decision-making  
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