高管薪酬激励、产权性质与企业绩效——基于股权集中度的调节效应

本文以高管薪酬激励为视角，将高管薪酬激励、股权集中度与企业绩效放在一个统一的分析框架下，以产权性质为依据，收集了 2007~2015 年国有企业与民营企业的面板数据，分别实证检验了高管薪酬激励与企业绩效的关系，以及股权集中度是否在其中发挥调节作用。研究发现：高管薪酬激励对企业绩效有显著的促进作用，并且国有企业中的促进作用要强于民营企业；股权集中度在国有企业中对于高管薪酬激励与企业绩效之间的关系有显著的负向调节作用，而在民营企业中不存在显著调节作用。

Executive Compensation Incentive,Property Right and Corporate Performance: the Moderate Effects of Ownership Concentration

In the perspective of executive compensation incentive，this paper puts the executive compensation incentive，ownership concentration and corporate performance under a unified analysis framework，and based on property rights，using the panel data of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises from 2007 to 2015 to test the relationship between executive compensation incentive and corporate performance and discuss whether the ownership concentration has moderating effect. Research ?nds: executive compensation incentive plays a signi?cant role in promoting corporate performance，and the promoting effect is stronger on state-owned enterprises than private enterprises; ownership concentration has signi?cantly negative moderating effect on executive compensation incentive and performance in state-owned enterprises，while the moderating effect is not obvious in private enterprises.