On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-Value Auctions |
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| Authors: | Maria Angeles de Frutos Robert W Rosenthal |
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| Institution: | aDepartamento de Economia, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Madrid, Spain;bDepartment of Economics, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, 02215 |
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| Abstract: | Equilibria are constructed for classes of game models of sequenced second-price auctions having identical common-valued objects. In some of these the equilibrium price falls on average, and in others the seller loses on average by committing to announce publicly something that he knows. Both of these possibilities are surprises.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D44. |
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