同质市场中产量匹配惩罚策略下的默契合谋

本文研究了同质产品市场中产量匹配惩罚策略下的默契合谋。我们得到的结论如下:(1)同质市场中的默契合谋是可能的;(2)垄断产量不可能通过合谋实现;(3)与纳什回归惩罚策略相比,合谋有可能更加困难,也有可能同等容易。我们将得到的结论与Lu and Wright(2010)所研究的价格匹配惩罚策略下的默契合谋进行了比较,并给出了一个线性需求函数的例子。

Tacit Collusion with Quantity-Matching Punishments in a Homogeneous Market

This paper investigates the tacit collusion with quantity-matching punishments in a market with homogeneous goods.The findings are the following:(1) Tacit collusion can arise with quantity-matching punishments;(2) Monopoly output quantity cannot be supported by quantity-matching punishment strategy;(3) Compared with the Nash-reversion strategy,collusion is not easier to sustain,but not necessarily harder.Our results are compared with those in Lu and Wright(2010) with price-matching punishments.We also provi...