Contingency Fees, Settlement Delay, and Low-Quality Litigation: Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets |
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Authors: | Helland Eric; Tabarrok Alexander |
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Institution: | Claremont McKenna College |
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Abstract: | Although flat fees are common for divorces, wills and trusts,and probate, lawyers in personal injury cases generally arepaid by contingency fee or at an hourly rate. Arguments havebeen made that contingency fees increase low-quality, "frivolous"litigation but counterarguments suggest that contingency feesactually limit such litigation and instead it is hourly feesthat increase low-quality litigation. Using a difference indifferences test and data on a cross section of states in 1992,we test whether legal quality is lower under contingency orhourly fees. We also examine medical malpractice claims in Floridausing a time series centered around a law change that limitedcontingency fees. We also examine the impact of fee arrangementson the expected time to settlement. We find that hourly feesencourage the filing of low-quality suits and increase the timeto settlement (i.e., contingency fees increase legal qualityand decrease the time to settlement). |
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