控股股东所有权结构与关联方担保

本文以我国A股上市公司1998年到2003年的关联方担保数据为研究对象,检验了不同股权结构下上市公司关联方担保发生的概率及其对公司价值的影响。本文的结果显示,随着上市公司控股股东持股比例的增加,上市公司为关联方担保发生的概率呈现出先显著上升、其后不显著、最后显著下降的交化趋势。此外,我们还进一步发现为关联方担保对上市公司自身价值的影响显著为负,且这种负相关关系在控股股东持股比例偏低时显著加强,而在控股股东持股比例处于高位时显著降低。这些研究发现意味着监管关联方担保行为的重点应更多侧重于控股股东持股水平较低的上市公司。

Controlling Shareholders'''' Ownership and Loan Guarantees to the Related Parties

We examine a sample of loan guarantees provided from the Chinese listed com- panies to their related parties from 1998 to 2003.Basing on the theory of convergence-of-in- terests effect and entrenchment effect,we address two questions in this paper:how does the ownership structure affect likelihood of loan guarantees?And consequently,how does the firm value related to loan guarantees provided to related parties?Our evidence indicates that the likelihood ratio of loan guarantees first increases,then unaffected,and finally decreases significantly as controlling shareholders'ownership arises.Moreover,we also find that the existence of loan guarantees is negatively associated with the listed firms'value.This negative association is particularly strong when the controlling shareholders hold less than 25% of to- tal shares and much weak when their ownership exceeds 40%.The results support that both convergence-of-interests effect and entrenchment effect exist and function under different ownership structures.