多参与人条件下并购中博弈决策机制研究

传统并购决策考虑的是决策者如何在并购的可行方案中选出最优或次优策略,很少涉及到当对手策略变化时所选的策略是否最优。并购决策是多人相关决策,需要在多个利益相关者相互影响的环境中研究并购策略的合理性。需要考虑主并企业内部股东和管理层,主并企业与政府、竞争对手和目标企业多个利益相关者之间的相互影响。由于股东和经营管理者利益的不同,股东须通过设计适当的激励和约束机制,使经营管理者个人利益与股东利益协调统一。企业并购决策是竞争对手参与并购可能性以及目标企业对主并企业、竞争对手参与并购信念的依存函数。政府是否批准并购项目与项目的前景属性相关。目标企业的所有制形式对并购有重要影响,目标企业是国有企业,管理层和员工的利益不可忽视,对于非国有企业,主要考虑的是预期收益。

Games Analysis of Decision-making in Mergers and Acquisitions under the Conditon of Muti-players

Classic theories of decision-making consider how acquirers choose optimum or second-optimum feasible strategy in Mergers and Aequisitions. When competitors change their strategies, little considered is whether the selected strategy is optimum. Decision-making of Mergers and Acquisitions is multi-person relate decision-making. The feasibility of strategy depends on how stakeholders influence each other, including stockers and managers, competitors, targets and government. Because of different benefits, stockers must design good inspiring and restricting system to unite their benefits. Whether acquirers make decision or not depends on probability of competitors＂ acquisition and target＇s belief that acquirer and its competitors make acquisition. Whether Mergers and Acquisition is approved depends on government＇s attitude to project prospect. Ownership of target has important impact on Mergers and Acquisitions. If target is a state-owned company, benefit of managers and employees are not neglected. For private companies, expected benefit is mainly considered.