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高管控制下的财务重述与高管薪酬关系研究
引用本文:杨蓉.高管控制下的财务重述与高管薪酬关系研究[J].证券市场导报,2011(1).
作者姓名:杨蓉
作者单位:华东师范大学商学院;
基金项目:国家社科基金项目“规范垄断行业企业高管薪酬问题研究(项目批准号09BJY031)”的系列研究成果之一
摘    要:本文在西方学者的管理层权力论基础上,结合中国垄断企业的特点,进一步提出了高管控制论,以2000~2008年曾发生过财务重述的我国代表性垄断行业上市公司共148个重述样本作为研究对象,深入分析高管控制与高管薪酬的相关性,考察了高管以财务重述为路径,影响企业财务业绩进而提高薪酬的可能性。研究发现:高管控制与高管薪酬显著正相关;虽然我国绝大部分国有垄断企业的高管不拥有或较少拥有股票和期权,财务重述仍然会影响公司高管的薪酬。

关 键 词:高管控制  高管薪酬  财务重述  

The relationship between the financial restatement and the executive compensation under the executive control
Yang Rong.The relationship between the financial restatement and the executive compensation under the executive control[J].Securities Market Herald,2011(1).
Authors:Yang Rong
Abstract:Based on the theories on the power of the executive which was proposed by western scholars,this paper proposed further theory on the executive control,combining the characteristics of the monopolies in China.It chose a sample of 148 listed companies in monopoly industries that once occurred financial restatement in 2000~2008 as research object to make an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the executive control and the executive compensation.Based on these,it studied the possibility that the execu...
Keywords:executive control  executive compensation  financial restatement  
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