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EXTERNALITIES AGGREGATION IN NETWORK GAMES

Authors:	Francesco Feri Paolo Pin

Affiliation:	1. Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, United Kingdom, and Department of Economics, Università di Trieste, Italy;2. Department of Economics and Statistics, Università di Siena, Italy, and IGIER and BIDSA, Università Bocconi, Italy We thank Daron Acemoglu, Pierpaolo Battigalli, Francesca Garbin, Sanjeev Goyal, Alessia Melegaro, Brian Rogers, and the seminar participants at Bocconi University in Milan, Cattolica University in Milan;3. the Center for Studies in Economics and Finance in Naples, Genève University, GREQAM Marseille, Universidad de Malaga, and the University of Verona. We acknowledge funding from the Italian Ministry of Education Progetti di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale (PRIN) grant 4. 2017ELHNNJ.

Abstract:	We generalize the results on the monotonicity of equilibria for network games with incomplete information. We show that not only the distinction between strategic complements and strategic substitutes is important in determining the nature of the Bayesian Nash equilibria, but the nature of the statistic itself is also determinant. We show that understanding the underlying forces behind people's choices may be of fundamental importance for a policymaker that wants to incentivize efficient behavior.

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