资格后审中激励机制对业主和承包商的博弈影响

随着建筑业的发展,工程中的合同形式也越来越多元化,而不同的合同形式业主和承包商所承担的风险也是不同的,业主为了减少风险更多的在合同中采取激励机制。文本主要站在业主的角度,运用不对称信息博弈理论,探讨了在招投标过程中采用资格后审的情况下,业主采取激励机制所可能承担的风险和损失,并据此提出了几点建议,有助于业主和承包商双方最终达到双赢的局面。

Effect of Incentive Mechanism in Post Qualification on the Owner and the Contractor

With the development of the construction industry, engineering contract form is more and more diversified, and the risks that the owner and the contractor are going to take are different. To reduce the risks, the owner usually uses incentive mechanism. The text, from the owner＇s standpoint, uses asymmetric information game theory, explores the risks and losses the owners may bear by selecting incentive mechanism in bidding process under the post qualification conditions, and accordingly puts forward some suggestions, to help both the owner and the contractor to eventually achieve a win-win situation.