| 独立董事与管理者事前与事后串谋防范问题研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘惠萍,王伟. 独立董事与管理者事前与事后串谋防范问题研究[J]. 当代经济管理, 2007, 29(4): 46-49 |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘惠萍 王伟 |
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| 作者单位： | 山东经济学院,山东,济南,250014;山东经济学院,山东,济南,250014 |
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| 基金项目： | 山东省社科基金项目“我国公司治理中:公司治理结构与存在的问题及对策研究”(05BJZ55) |
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| 摘 要： | 无论在理论上还是实践中,我国上市公司管理者和独立董事之间串谋行为都是一个不容忽视的问题。本文在国内外防范串谋理论成果的基础上,研究设计了同时防范管理者与独立董事之间的事前串谋与事后串谋的最优激励机制模型,给出了几种情形下主契约防范串谋的必要条件,并且对其应用提出了一些有益的建议,以促进我国独立董事制度的规范、有效运行。
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| 关 键 词： | 独立董事 管理者 串谋 事前串谋 事后串谋 |
| 文章编号： | 1673-0461（2007）04-0046-04 |
Preventing Ex-ante and Ex-post Collusion between Independent Directors and Managers |
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| LIU Hui-ping,WANG Wei. Preventing Ex-ante and Ex-post Collusion between Independent Directors and Managers[J]. Contemporary Economic Management, 2007, 29(4): 46-49 |
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| Authors: | LIU Hui-ping WANG Wei |
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| Affiliation: | Shandong University of Economics, Jinan 250014, China |
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| Abstract: | Both in theory and practice,the collusion between managers and independent directors couldn't be neglected in Chinese listed companies.Based on the research of collusion-prevention theories in foreign countries and in China,a model of optimal incentive mechanism of preventing ex-ante and ex-post collusions is established.The necessary conditions and some suggestions for its application are presented to promote the normal and efficient exertion of independent director system. |
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| Keywords: | independent directors managers collusion ex-ante collusion ex-post collusion |
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