可持续公共债务水平下的政府违约问题研究

现实经济中存在公共债务具有可持续性时却发生政府违约的现象,本文在政府未来收支波动具有不确定性的假设下,建立一个政府与投资者的重复博弈模型以分析这一现象,研究发现:公共债务可持续性并不能完全排除政府违约风险,在政府未来基本盈余不确定的条件下,理性投资者愿意持有的公共债务水平远低于可持续的公共债务水平,两者的差异取决于政府对未来基本盈余的控制能力.

Study of Government Default on Sustainable Public Debt Level

There are many cases of government default while their public debt featured as sustainability.In order to analyze the argument,this paper builds on a repeated game between the government and investors under the uncertainty of government primary surplus.We find that there is a probability of illiquidity crisis,which results the government cannot service its outstanding debt and is forced to default,then puts forward a risk-free debt level.This level may be much lower than the sustainable level;the difference...