董事高管责任保险与上市公司关联交易——基于我国上市公司经验数据的检验

董事高管责任保险(D&O保险)是一个市场化的外部治理机制。基于沪深证券交易所2003—2017年上市公司数据,本文实证检验了D&O保险对上市公司关联交易的影响。研究发现,D&O保险显著提升了关联交易总水平、关联销售金额和关联购买金额;根据控股产权性质分组研究发现,D&O保险对非国有控股公司关联交易的正向影响,比对国有控股公司更加显著;D&O保险、关联交易均与公司价值显著正相关,且关联交易发挥中介效应。研究表明,D&O保险通过监督效应提升关联交易,并促使其对公司价值发挥支持效应。研究加深了对D&O保险治理职能的理解,更新了对关联交易经济后果的惯性认知,对促进公司治理治理机制建设和完善现代企业制度具有重要的理论和现实意义。

Directors and Officers Liability Insurance and Related Transactions of Listed Companies:Test Based on the Empirical Data of Chinese Listed Companies

Directors and officers liability insurance(D&O)is an important market-oriented governance mechanism.Based on the data of listed companies from 2003 to 2017,the paper tests the impact of D&O on related party transactions(RPT).It finds that D&O significantly improves the total level of RPT and the amount of RPT sales and RPT purchases;A group study finds that D&O has more significant impacts on non-state-owned companies than on state-owned companies.Further research shows that D&O and RPT are significantly positively correlated with corporate value,and RPT have intermediary effect.It means that D&O will enhance RPT through supervisory effect,and promote it to play supporting effect on corporate value.It deepens the understanding of D&O and renews the understanding of RPT’s economic consequences.It has important theoretical and practical significance on the construction of governance mechanism and the construction of modern enterprise system.